
















		 Of	 course,	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 in	 many	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 developed	
world,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 decision-making	 for	 incompetent	 patients	 (who	 were	
previously	competent)	should,	as	much	as	possible,	aim	to	reflect	what	the	patient	
herself	 either	 wanted	 or	 would	 have	 wanted	 if	 she	 had	 thought	 it	 through.	 The	
preferred	 tools	 for	 decision-making	 are	 advance	 directives	 and/or	 surrogates	
tasked	with	 informing	 physicians	what	 the	 patient	would	 have	wanted.	 In	 such	 a	







at	 the	bedside,	 caregivers	may	simply	want	 to	know	what	 the	patient	wanted,	but	
the	 patient	 in	 formulating	 her	 directive	 is	 not	 asking	 herself	what	 she	wants,	 but	
rather	is	trying	to	understand	what	she	should	want.	She	wants	to	know	what	really	
would	be	in	her	best	interests.	Second,	many	individuals	tell	their	loved	ones—the	





what	 the	 patient	 wanted,	 in	 many	 cases	 what	 the	 patient	 wanted	 was	 for	 the	
surrogate	to	make	a	 judgment	about	best	 interests.	Finally,	 there	are	always	some	













traumatic	 brain	 injury.2	Unlike	 coma	 patients,	 PVS	 patients	 do	 have	 sleep/wake	
cycles	as	well	as	certain	other	reflexes,	and	involuntary	movements.	But	the	general	









2	Some	 patients	 also	 end	 up	 in	 vegetative	 states	 in	 the	 final	 phases	 of	 degenerative	 or	 metabolic	
neurologic	 diseases	 and	 some	 are	 vegetative	 as	 a	 result	 of	 developmental	 malformations	 of	 the	






externally.	 It	 is	 diagnosed	 by	 the	 complete	 absence	 over	 time	 of	 even	 the	 most	
minute	signs	of	voluntary	movement	or	 responsiveness	 (Multi-Society	Task	Force,	
1994,	 p.	 1500).	When,	 over	 the	 further	 course	 of	 time,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 a	VS	
patient	is	not	going	to	improve,	the	diagnosis	of	PVS	is	given.3	Some	patients	initially	
diagnosed	 as	 vegetative	 do	 subsequently	 improve.	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
emphasize	that	very	few	of	those	in	a	vegetative	state	for	more	than	a	year	improve	
significantly.	 Still,	 it	 not	 infrequently	 happens	 that	 patients	 who	 once	 showed	 no	
visible	signs	of	awareness,	later	begin	to	show	signs	of	minimal	awareness.		
	 To	 account	 for	 this,	 in	 2002,	 the	 Aspen	Neurobehavioral	 Conference	Work	
Group	 introduced	a	new	diagnostic	category,	 that	of	 the	minimally	conscious	state	























MCS	 have	 regular	 patterns	 of	 brain	 activation	 in	 response	 to	 verbal	 commands—
patterns	that	closely	resemble	the	patterns	of	brain	activation	observed	in	healthy	
volunteers	(Monti	et	al.,	2010).	The	researchers	first	developed	two	mental	tasks—
(1)	a	motor	 imagery	 task	 that	 involves	 imagining	oneself	 swinging	a	 tennis	 racket	
and	(2)	a	spatial	 imagery	task	that	involves	imagining	oneself	walking	through	the	










	 Going	 a	 step	 further,	 researchers	 decided	 to	 try	 to	 communicate	 with	 a	








Thus	 out	 of	 the	 original	 54,	 roughly	 9%	 responded.	 However,	 it	 is	 significant	 that	 all	 of	 the	
responders	had	suffered	traumatic	brain	injury.	There	were	33	traumatic	brain	injury	patients	in	the	
study,	making	the	response	rate	within	that	group	 roughly	15%.	This	 is	 important	to	keep	in	mind,	







	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 know	precisely	what	 these	 results	mean,	 but	 it	 is	 clearly	 both	
fascinating	 (from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 science)	 and	disturbing	 (for	 it	 is	 possible	 that	
these	patients	have	been	suffering	for	years	unbeknownst	to	us).	Interpreting	these	
results	 is	made	more	difficult	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 involuntary,	unconscious	part	of	
the	mind	is	far	more	sophisticated,	and	controls	far	more	of	our	behavior,	than	most	
of	 us	 realize.	 This	 raises	 the	 difficult	 question	 of	whether	what	 these	 researchers	
have	 observed	 is	 a	 function	 of	 involuntary,	 unconscious	 processes	 or	 whether—
more	excitingly—it	 is	a	 function	of	the	voluntary,	conscious	mind.	 It	 is	hard	to	see	
how	on	the	basis	of	current	evidence	we	could	hope	to	answer	 that	question	with	
any	certainty.6	But	even	if	the	best	we	can	say	is,	“They	might	be	conscious”—this	is	




	 My	 goals	 for	 this	 essay	 are	 two-fold.	 First,	 I	 wish	 to	 articulate	 a	 general	
framework	 for	 thinking	 about	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 severely	 compromised	
incompetent	patients	such	as	patients	in	VS	or	MCS.	In	particular,	I	wish	to	articulate	
the	two	most	important	questions	that	ought	to	guide	our	thinking	in	this	area,	and	






results	mean.	 Over	 the	 past	 thirty	 years,	 research	 psychologists	 have	 documented	 the	 astounding	
number	 of	 ways	 in	which	 the	 fast	 working	 part	 of	 the	mind—what	 Daniel	 Kahneman	 (2011)	 has	






are	 simply	 these:	 ‘Do	 they	 suffer?’	 and	 	 ‘Are	 they	 deriving	 any	 benefit	 from	 their	
lives?’		
	 My	 second	 goal	 is	 more	 substantive.	 I	 wish	 to	 defend	 an	 answer	 to	 the	
question	of	what	would	be	best	overall	for	patients	in	a	permanent	vegetative	state	
or	 in	 a	 permanent	 state	 of	 minimal	 consciousness.	 I	 shall	 argue	 that,	 all	 things	
considered,	 it	would	 be	better	 for	 them	 to	 allow	 them	 to	 die.	 I	 limit	my	 claims	 to	
these	patients,	since	in	these	cases	one	does	not	have	to	struggle	with	the	additional	
complicated	 question	 of	 how	 much	 weight	 to	 give	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 future	
improvement.	To	grapple	with	that	question	would	require	both	some	sense	of	how	



























in	 someone	 else’s	 hands.	 It	 is	 worth	 emphasizing,	 because	 it	 is	 so	 frequently	
forgotten,	that	this	does	not	mean	the	person	in	charge	of	making	decisions	for	an	
incompetent	patient	should	neglect	currently	expressed	preferences	of	the	patient.7	
The	person	 in	 charge	 of	making	 a	 decision	 should	 consider	 and	weigh	 everything	
possibly	relevant.		
	 I	 nonetheless	 assume	 that	 the	 responses	 of	 VS	 and	 MCS	 patients	 in	 fMRI	
scans	are	not	sufficient	to	license	the	conclusion	that	they	are	competent,	leaving	us	
to	conclude	as	a	matter	of	default	that	they	are	incompetent.8	This	matters,	because	
some	 theorists	 have	 expressed	 the	 hope	 that	 we	 might	 be	 able	 to	 use	 fMRI	
technology	and	the	yes/no	communication	task	to	ask	these	patients	whether	they	
are	suffering,	or	even	more	dramatically	whether	they	wish	to	be	kept	alive	in	their	
current	 state	 (Monti	 et	 al.,	 2010,	 p.589;	 Sinnott-Armstrong	 2011).	 But	 even	 if	we	
eventually	put	such	questions	to	these	patients,	and	even	if	they	respond,	the	mere	



















we	want	 to	 know	 a	 great	 deal	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 processes—emotional	 and	
cognitive—that	 went	 into	 yielding	 the	 answer.	 And	 it	 is	 extremely	 difficult	 to	
imagine	 how	 we	 could	 assess	 the	 quality	 of	 decision-making	 for	 patients	 in	 this	




open-ended	way	 (moving	 past	 simple	 yes/no	 responses	 to	 questions)	 so	 that	 we	
could	get	a	better	sense	of	what	the	patient	is	thinking	(if	anything)	independently	
of	 being	 prompted.	 For	 the	 time	 being,	 however,	 we	must	 continue	 to	 view	 such	




The	question	that	 interests	me	is	a	question	about	what	is	good	 for	 these	patients.	
First,	 however,	 I	 want	 to	 make	 clear	 the	 relationship	 between	 different	 bits	 of	




















be	 best	 overall.	 This	 is	 to	 wonder	 about	 which	 choice	 would	 be	 best	 from	 the	
standpoint	 of	 prudential	 value,	 or	 in	 other	 words,	 which	 choice	 would	 be	 good	
relative	to	the	options	available.		
	 The	relationship	between	good	choices	and	prudential	value	can	be	complex	
for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons.	 To	 begin	 with,	 good	 choices	 must	 typically	 reflect	 an	
appropriate	balance	between	concern	for	the	present	and	concern	for	the	future.	A	
good	prudential	 choice	does	not	 always	maximize	present	 value.	 Second,	 a	 choice	
can	 be	 good	 intrinsically,	 in	 virtue	 of	 directly	 increasing	 prudential	 value	 in	 a	
person’s	life,	or	instrumentally,	in	virtue	of	bringing	a	person	closer	to	being	able	to	
realize	something	of	prudential	value.	Finally,	as	already	indicated,	it	is	important	to	
remember	 that	although	we	often	speak	 loosely	of	 ‘doing	what	 is	good	or	best	 for	




	 How	then	 is	prudential	value	related	 to	 interests?	As	generally	understood,	
interests	 are	 those	 things—events,	 persons,	 objects—that	 we	 have	 a	 stake	 in.	 A	
person	 is	 said	 to	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 something—for	 example,	 an	 interest	 in	
obtaining	or	retaining	a	possession,	an	 interest	 in	having	a	certain	relationship,	or	
an	 interest	 in	 the	occurrence	of	 a	 certain	 event—if	 that	 thing	has	 the	potential	 to	
affect	 the	 prudential	 value	 of	 her	 life.	 As	 sometimes	 used	 in	 legal	 contexts,	 the	
potential	 to	 affect	 prudential	 value	 need	 only	 be	 slight,	 and	 in	 such	 cases	 the	










because	 this	 improves	 her	 life	 in	 a	 direct	way.	 Similarly,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 a	
young	person	who	aspires	to	go	to	college	to	prepare	well	for	the	SAT.	Preparation	
is	no	guarantee	of	success,	but	it	greatly	increases	the	odds,	moving	her	significantly	
closer	 to	 the	 realization	 of	 something	 prudentially	 valuable	 for	 her.	 Talk	 of	 best	
interests	 is	 simply	 talk	of	what	would	be	best	overall	 for	 a	person	once	all	 of	her	
various	 interests	 have	 been	 considered.	 The	 notion	 of	 best	 interests	 is	 thus	
equivalent	 to	 the	notion	of	what	would,	 relative	 to	 the	 circumstances,	 be	 the	best	
prudential	choice	for	a	person.		
	 For	the	purposes	of	this	paper	there	is	no	need	to	offer	a	theory	of	prudential	
value,	 and	 that	 is	 fortunate,	 for	 such	 theories	 are	 often	 highly	 controversial.	
Interestingly,	 although	 there	 is	 often	 great	 disagreement	 about	what	makes	 a	 life	
positively	 good,	 there	 is	 considerably	 less	 disagreement	 about	 what	 makes	 a	 life	
bad.	In	this	sense,	there	is	an	important	asymmetry	in	ordinary	thinking	about	best	
interests,	 and	 in	 this	 case	 that	 asymmetry	works	 to	my	 advantage.	 I	 shall	 restrict	
myself	then	to	two	claims	about	how	we	should	approach	the	question	of	prudential	
value	 for	 severely	 compromised	 patients,	 such	 as	 those	 with	 disorders	 of	
consciousness.		
	 My	 first	claim	 is	 that	 if	anything	can	 tip	 the	balance	 in	 favor	of	death,	 i.e.	 if	
anything	 can	make	 it	 true	 that	 it	 is	 in	a	person’s	overall	best	 interests	 to	die,	 it	 is	
extended	 suffering.	 Hence,	 we	 must	 always	 inquire	 as	 far	 as	 we	 can	 about	 the	
suffering	of	such	patients.	The	basic	 idea	that	suffering	is	a	form	of	prudential	bad	
and	that	its	presence	makes	a	life	worse	is	not	all	that	controversial.	I	shall	assume,	








ethics	 on	 pain	 and	 suffering	 can	 often	 lead	 us	 to	 overlook	 this	 fact.	 The	 mere	
absence	of	suffering,	while	necessary,	 is	not	sufficient	to	underwrite	the	claim	that	
continued	life	is	best	overall.	
	 These	 then	are	 the	questions	 that	should	guide	our	 thinking.	 I	now	wish	 to	






Obviously,	one	of	 the	more	disturbing	aspects	of	 the	recent	 fMRI	based	 findings	 is	
the	worry	 that	 some	number	of	patients	previously	 thought	 to	be	entirely	 lacking	
awareness,	might	actually	be	suffering	silently,	internally,	unable	to	reveal	through	
any	kind	of	 voluntary	movement	what	 they	are	 feeling,	 and	unable	 to	 receive	any	
help.	 Discovering	 the	 existence	 and	 extent	 of	 suffering	 in	 these	 patients	 may	 be	
extremely	difficult.	Nonetheless,	the	question	of	suffering	is	clearly	relevant	in	a	way	
that	means	we	must	at	least	try	to	find	out.	Not	only	do	we	want	to	know	whether	
they	 suffer,	 but	 if	 they	 do,	 we	 want	 to	 know	 whether	 anything	 can	 be	 done	 to	
alleviate	it.	And	if	their	suffering	cannot	be	alleviated,	we	need	to	remain	open	to	the	
possibility	that	continued	life	may	not	be	in	their	best	interests.		
	 But	 what	 exactly	 is	 suffering?	What	 precisely	 are	we	 trying	 to	 determine?	
Most	 people	 assume	 that	 the	 question	 before	 us	 is	 a	 question	 about	 pain.	 Clearly	













suffering	 on	 the	 other.10	On	 my	 view,	 ‘pain’	 picks	 out	 a	 certain	 class	 of	 physical	
sensations	that	occur	in	our	bodies	and	which	we	find	immediately	and	intrinsically	
aversive.11	Suffering,	however,	 is	more	complex.	Suffering	 is	affective,	and	 it	has	 to	
do	with	the	way	we	interpret	our	immediate	physical	experiences,	as	well	the	events	
of	 our	 lives,	 and	 the	 events	 we	 see	 occurring	 around	 us.	 It	 is	 often,	 though	 not	





am	 not	 claiming	 that	 suffering	 is	 produced	 by	 conscious,	 deliberative	 thought	
processes.	 It	 is	 not.	 Indeed,	 in	 some	 cases	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 world	 that	
informs	an	 individual’s	 suffering	 can	 co-exist	with,	 and	be	at	odds	with,	her	more	
consciously	held	views.	This	 is	because	 the	 interpretations	 that	yield	suffering	are	
the	product	of	the	affective	side	our	nature.		



















feel,	 think,	 and	 act	 in	 certain	 ways.	 Sadness,	 for	 example,	 disposes	 us	 to	 certain	
physical	 sensations,	 leads	 us	 to	 think	 certain	 thoughts,	 and	 creates	 a	 tendency	
towards	certain	kinds	of	actions.	Moods	are	also	dispositions—ones	that	shape	our	
intuitive	 perceptions	 of	 the	 world	 in	 negative	 or	 positive	 ways.	 In	 addition	 to	
emotions	 and	 moods,	 we	 can	 view	 individuals	 as	 having	 broader,	 more	 general	
dispositions	that	determine	the	frequency	with	which	those	individuals	experience	
particular	types	of	emotions,	as	well	as	good	or	bad	moods.	I	shall	call	these	affective	
dispositions.	 A	 person	 with	 a	 set	 of	 negative	 affective	 dispositions	 will	 tend	 to	
experience	more	negative	 emotions	 and	 she	will	 be	 implicitly	 disposed	 to	 see	 the	
world	 through	 a	 dark	 colored	 lens.	 Suffering,	 as	 I	 understand	 it,	 is	 the	 product	 of	
extremely	negative	affective	dispositions.		





even	when	 an	 individual	 understands	 that	 her	 pain	 poses	 no	 threat	 to	 her	 health	
(For	example,	I	may	understand	that	I	feel	pain	because	a	nerve	has	been	damaged,	
but	that	otherwise	my	body	is	intact	and	free	of	illness)	it	may	still	be	that	her	pain,	
if	 extreme	 enough	 and	 prolonged	 enough,	 will	 lead	 her	 to	 suffer	 for	 the	 simple	
reason	 that	 constant	 pain	 restricts	 in	 numerous	ways	 a	 person’s	 ability	 to	 derive	
value	 and	 positive	 meaning	 from	 other	 aspects	 of	 her	 life.	 It	 is	 because	 of	 the	
suffering	pain	can	cause	that	we	sometimes	view	a	life	of	extreme	pain	as	not	worth	
living.	But	although	pain	often	leads	to	suffering,	the	more	important	point	for	the	











the	 limited	 case	where	 there	was	 insufficient	 evidence	of	what	 the	patient	herself	
would	 have	 wanted.	 The	 first	 test,	 that	 the	 justices	 labeled	 the	 ‘limited	 objective	
test,’	 requires	 that	 decision-makers	 be	 certain	 that	 the	 burdens	 of	 continued	 life	
with	 treatment	 (where	 burdens	 are	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 pain	 that	 cannot	 be	
eliminated	with	 treatment)	 outweigh	 any	 benefits	 the	 patient	 is	 getting	 from	 her	
life,	 and	 it	 also	 requires	 that	 there	be	 some	 evidence	 that	 the	patient	would	have	
wished	to	forgo	the	treatment	in	such	circumstances.	According	to	the	second,	‘pure	
objective	test,’	 life	sustaining	treatment	can	be	stopped	in	the	complete	absence	of	




be	 confident	 that	 it	 is	 in	 a	 person’s	 best	 interests	 to	 die.	 This	 strikes	 me	 as	
problematic	in	at	 least	two	ways.	First,	 if	one	can	be	certain	that	the	patient	is	not	
benefiting	 from	her	 life	 (the	 topic	 of	 the	 next	 section),	 then	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	





that	 the	 patient	 was	 not	 mentally	 intact	 enough	 to	 suffer,	 even	 if	 she	 could	
experience	physical	pain.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 likely	true	that	the	possibility	of	suffering	











We	do	not	know	 if	 they	are	aware	enough	 to	 think	much,	and	we	have	no	way	of	
knowing	 what	 they	 can	 think	 about.	 Just	 because	 parts	 of	 the	 mind	 have	 been	
preserved,	we	still	do	not	know	whether	they	remember	much	of	their	previous	life,	
whether	they	experience	emotions,	whether	they	contemplate	their	current	plight.	
But	 it	 does	 seem	 safe	 to	 assume	 that	 if	 these	 individuals	 are	 capable	 of	 thinking	
about	 and	 evaluating	 their	 current	 situation,	 they	 are	most	 likely	 suffering	 in	 the	
extreme.	 For	 they	 have	 lost	 a	 great	 deal,	 have	 little	 or	 nothing	 to	 gain,	 and	 are	
isolated	beyond	imagining.	Nor	is	it	feasible,	given	the	current	costs,	to	suppose	that	









	 It	 can	 be	 easy	 to	 overlook	 the	 significance	 of	 this	 question.	 In	 part,	 this	 is	
because	 theorists	often	 frame	the	 issue	 in	 terms	of	what	 it	would	 take	 for	 it	 to	be	


















14	(Warning:	 this	 is	 a	 footnote	 for	 philosophers.	 Everyone	 else	 can	 feel	 free	 to	 ignore	 it.)	 Some	
philosophical	readers	may	object	that	this	assumes	the	truth	of	some	sort	of	mental-state	theory	of	
prudential	value	as	opposed	to	a	state-of-the-world	theory	(Griffin,	1986,	p.17).	Among	philosophers,	
at	 any	 rate,	 such	 theories	 are	 highly	 controversial,	 so	 if	 it	 were	 true	 that	 would	 indeed	 be	
problematic.	However,	no	such	assumption	is	being	made.		
	 The	standard	example	of	a	state-of-the-world	theory	is	the	desire	theory,	according	to	which	
what	 is	 good	 for	 someone	 is	 getting	 what	 she	 wants,	 here	 understood	 as	 the	 coming	 true	 of	 her	




could	 be	 said	 to	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 continued	 living.	 This	 is	 because	 a	 permanently	 unconscious	
patient	 forms	no	new	desires,	 and	her	old	desires	 fall	 into	one	of	 two	categories.	Either	 they	have	
already	been	 frustrated	or	satisfied.	 (For	example,	 suppose	a	patient	wanted	 to	someday	swim	the	
English	Channel:	 that	desire	was	 frustrated	on	 the	day	she	suffered	her	 traumatic	brain	 injury	and	
entered	PVS.)	Or	they	remain	open,	in	the	sense	that	future	events	in	the	world	may	either	satisfy	or	
frustrate	 those	 desires,	 but	 this	 can	 happen	 equally	 well	 whether	 the	 patient	 lives	 or	 dies.	 (For	






of-the-world	 theorists	 think	 that	 a	permanently	unconscious	person	 retains	 a	number	of	 interests,	
and	they	object	to	the	common	assumption	that	beings	lacking	the	capacity	for	consciousness	have	





	 In	 thinking	 about	 this	 issue	 I	 have	 found	 an	 older	 debate—a	 debate	 about	
when	we	ought	 to	 treat	severely	 impaired	newborns—illuminating.	 I	do	not	mean	





severely	 impaired	 newborns. 15 	For	 centuries,	 majority	 opinion	 deemed	
handicapped	 lives	as	not	worth	 living.	While	there	are	no	doubt	many	factors	that	
contributed	 to	 this,	 it	 largely	 reflected	 the	 judgments	 of	 ordinary	 people	 that	 it	
would	 be	 terrible	 to	 become	 handicapped.	 In	 other	 words,	 people	 with	 species-
typical	physical	and	mental	capacities	tried	to	imagine	what	their	life	would	be	like	
were	 they	 to	 lose	 those	 capacities,	 and	 they	 concluded	 it	 would	 not	 be	 worth	
much.16	They	 did	 not,	 by	 and	 large,	 consider	 the	 nuanced	 question	 of	 whether	
limited	capacities	might	still	be	better	than	none.	Nor	did	they	typically	invest	much	
effort	 in	 trying	 to	 imagine	 the	 perspective	 of	 someone	who	 from	birth	 had	 never	
possessed	the	full	set	of	species-typical	capacities.	Because	these	prejudices	were	so	
dominant,	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 to	 try	 and	 save	 the	 life	 of	 a	 child	 born	 with	




















it	was	also	clear	 to	many	of	 those	 involved,	 that	we	should	not	 simply	 try	 to	 save	






incapable	 of	 consciousness	 has	 no	 interest	 in	 continued	 life.	 For	 the	 anencephalic	
infant,	 as	 for	 an	 adult	 who	 has	 truly,	 permanently	 lost	 the	 capacity	 for	
consciousness,	life	is	neither	beneficial	nor	harmful.	But	what	about	those	children	
who	 are	 born	 with	 severe	 cognitive	 defects,	 who	 have	 some	 degree	 of	
consciousness,	but	only	a	small	degree?		
	 The	 standard	 move	 at	 the	 time	 was	 to	 assume	 that	 as	 long	 as	 a	 child	 is	
sentient	 but	 not	 suffering,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest	 to	 live.	 Some	 degree	 of	

















seemed	 to	 mark	 the	 point	 at	 which	 life	 becomes	 a	 benefit.	 This	 is	 the	 view,	 for	
example,	defended	by	the	legal	theorist	John	Robertson	in	an	influential	essay	from	
1975	(Robertson,	1975,	p.269).	Robertson	thinks	it	is	clearly	in	the	best	interests	of	
many—indeed,	 probably	 most—mentally	 handicapped	 children	 to	 live.	 But	 he	
recognizes	that	there	can	be	a	real	question	about	the	interests	of	certain	extremely	
impaired	but	 nonetheless	 sentient	 children.	He	 gives	 as	 his	 example	 the	 case	 of	 a	
“profoundly	 retarded,	 nonambulatory,	 blind,	 deaf	 infant	 who	 will	 spend	 his	 few	
years	in	the	back-ward	cribs	of	a	state	 institution”	(p.254).	We	are	to	imagine	that	
the	child’s	mental	handicaps	are	severe	enough	that	her	conscious	experience	is	at	
best	highly	 fragmented.	 It	 is	 completely	unclear	what,	 if	 anythin,	 she	understands	
about	her	world.		





both	 sorts.	 It	 seems	 hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 a	 child	 as	 profoundly	 retarded	 and	
deprived	of	sensory	 input	as	 the	child	he	describes	could	be	deriving	benefit	 from	





that	we	should	save	children	who	are	 this	 severely	 impaired.	But	unlike	me,	he	 is	
willing	 to	simply	cede	 the	 language	of	best	 interests	 to	 those	who,	 like	Robertson,	
claim	it	is	in	the	best	interests	of	such	a	child	to	live.	In	effect,	he	grants	it	is	in	the	
child’s	 interests	 to	 live,	 but	 argues	 that	 if	 that	 is	 so	we	must	move	 “beyond	 best	
interests”	(p.31).		Although	I	agree	with	Arras’s	conclusion	about	the	case,	I	think	we	
should	retain	the	 language	of	best	 interests	and	say,	 instead,	 that	 it	can	only	be	 in	
the	best	interests	of	a	child	to	live	if	she	either	has,	or	will	in	the	course	of	normal	
development	 acquire,	 the	 capacity	 to	 derive	 benefit	 from	 living.	 This	 would	 still	
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support	 the	 practical	 conclusion	Arras	 favors—the	 conclusion	 that	we	 should	 not	
treat	 such	 severely	 impaired	 infants.	 For	 I	 assume	 that	when	 treatment	 is	neither	
beneficial	nor	harmful	to	an	individual,	then	it	is	perfectly	legitimate	to	allow	other	
factors	 to	 help	 determine	 the	 decision,	 even	 factors	 that	 would	 not	 normally	 be	
allowed	to	have	weight.19	In	short,	if	the	child	cannot	derive	benefit	from	life,	then	it	
makes	sense	to	consider	the	financial	and	emotional	burdens	of	looking	after	such	a	
child,	 and	 to	 decide	 that	 it	 is	 simply	 not	 worth	 it.	 Such	 a	 decision	 will	 not	 be	
detrimental	 to	 the	 child,	 because	 we	 have	 already	 stipulated	 that	 we	 are	 dealing	
with	cases	in	which	death	is	not	a	harm	to	the	child.		
	 Arras	 goes	 on	 to	 consider	 under	 what	 conditions	 we	 should	 try	 to	 save	
impaired	 newborns.	 If	 mere	 sentience	 is	 not	 the	 important	 line,	 what	 is?	 My	
suggestion	is	that	we	view	this	as	a	question	about	the	minimal	capacities	necessary	
for	 life	 to	be	good	 for	 the	 individual	whose	 life	 it	 is	 (or	alternatively,	as	about	 the	
minimal	capacities	necessary	for	an	individual	to	be	able	to	extract	value	from	her	
own	 life).	 In	what	 follows	 I	want	 to	 consider	 two	possible	 answers,	 the	 second	of	
which	is	embraced	by	Arras.		





















with	 valuing. 21 	Minimally,	 to	 care	 about	 something	 I	 must	 be	 capable	 of	
distinguishing	it	from	other	things	in	the	world	and	(assuming	the	object	of	care	is	































neither	 benefited	 nor	 harmed	 by	 continued	 life,	 despite	 having	 some	 minimal	
degree	of	awareness.		
	 The	 second	 answer	 was	 originally	 proposed	 by	 the	 Catholic	 theologian	
Richard	McCormick	(1990)23	and	later	taken	up	and	endorsed	by	John	Arras	in	the	
same	 essay	 discussed	 earlier	 (1984,	 p.32-33).24	Call	 this	 the	 answer	 in	 terms	 of	
relationship.	On	this	view,	continued	life	is	only	good	for	those	impaired	infants	who	
have	 (or	 will	 have	 in	 the	 course	 of	 normal	 development)	 the	 capacity	 for	
relationships	with	others.		
	 A	lot	turns	on	what	exactly	we	take	a	relationship	to	be.	Just	as	it	is	possible	
to	 construe	 valuing	 in	 a	 way	 that	 makes	 it	 too	 complex	 for	 our	 purposes,	 it	 is	
similarly	possible	 to	describe	the	necessary	requirements	of	genuine	relationships	
in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 too	 complex.	 For	 our	 purposes	 we	 should	 seek	 to	 describe	 the	
simplest	possible	form	of	relationship,	and	it	is	useful	in	this	regard	to	consider	the	
change	 that	 occurs	 in	 infants	 at	 about	 three	months	 of	 age,	 when	 as	 people	 say,	
“social	smiling”	begins.	Prior	to	that	infants	smile	in	random	ways,	almost	as	if	they	
are	 just	 trying	 out	 their	 facial	muscles.	 Of	 course,	 for	 all	 we	 know	 they	might	 be	
smiling	in	response	to	pleasant	feelings.	There	is	no	way	to	be	sure.	But	even	if	that	





















and	 tracks	particular	people	perceptually,	and	she	responds	 to	 them	 in	distinctive	
ways.	 The	most	minimal	 form	 of	 communication	 can	 begin	 to	 occur	 at	 this	 point,	
because	the	infant	can	share	very	simple	feelings	with	the	other	person	and	learn	in	










	 Both	 of	 these	 answers—the	 answer	 in	 terms	 of	 caring	 and	 the	 answer	 in	
terms	of	relationship—contain	important	insights.	In	the	case	of	impaired	newborns	
the	capacity	to	care	may	come	closer	to	capturing	what	we	really	think	must	be	in	
place	 before	 life	 is	 beneficial,	 but	 the	 capacity	 for	 relationship	 may	 be	 easier	 to	
translate	into	some	sort	of	concrete	standard.	Moreover,	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	
in	developing	children	the	two	capacities	typically	arrive	at	a	similar	point	 in	time	
and	 serve	 to	 reinforce	 one	 another	 during	 the	 course	 of	 future	 development.	 The	
answer	in	terms	of	caring	may	also	shed	some	light	on	why	we	think	the	capacity	for	






the	world,	 the	 capacity	 to	 care	would,	 at	 best,	 offer	 us	 nothing,	 and	might	 in	 the	
worst	case	be	simply	a	deep	source	of	frustration.			 	
	 Of	 course,	 our	 primary	 concern	 here	 is	 with	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 patients	
with	disorders	of	consciousness.	What	should	we	say	about	them?	First,	I	think	we	
should	 conclude,	much	 as	 Arras	 did	 in	 the	 case	 of	 impaired	 newborns,	 that	more	
than	mere	sentience	is	necessary	in	order	for	life	to	be	a	benefit.	Second,	I	think	that	
the	two	answers	canvassed	in	the	discussion	of	newborns—the	answer	in	terms	of	
care	 and	 the	 answer	 in	 terms	 of	 relationship—can	 help	 resolve	 the	 question	 of	
whether	patients	with	disorders	of	consciousness	are	able	to	benefit	 from	life.	But	
the	way	in	which	they	may	help	is	not	immediately	obvious.		
	 The	 problem	 we	 face	 with	 these	 patients	 is	 that	 we	 do	 not	 know	 how	
mentally	intact	these	patients	are,	or	what	their	interior	mental	life	consists	of.	We	
are,	 instead,	 in	 the	 extremely	 frustrating	 position	 of	 knowing	 only	 that	 previous	
estimates	of	their	mental	life	were,	in	a	small	number	of	cases,	deeply	mistaken.	We	
thus	 know	 that	 some	 number	 of	 such	 patients	 have	 more	 mental	 life	 than	 we	
previously	 thought,	 but	 that	 is	 not	 really	 saying	 very	 much.	 Nor	 are	 we	 in	 any	
position	 to	 know	 whether	 these	 patients	 have	 the	 capacities	 I	 mentioned	 in	 the	
discussion	of	newborns.	Because	they	were	previously	competent	adults,	we	know	
they	once	possessed	the	capacity	to	care	and	the	capacity	for	relationships.	But	we	
have	 no	 way	 of	 knowing	 to	 what	 extent	 those	 capacities	 remain	 intact	 and	
functional.		
	 Nonetheless,	 despite	 our	 ignorance,	 there	 is	 one	 significant	 piece	 of	
information	we	possess	that	is	relevant	here.	Whether	or	not	they	have	the	capacity	
to	care,	current	resource	 limitations	ensure	that	 they	cannot	 in	their	present	state	
interact	 with	 their	 world	 or	 sustain	 meaningful	 relationships	 with	 others.	 The	
research	 suggests	 they	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 hear,	 but	 mere	 passive	 reception	 of	








For	all	we	know,	 these	kinds	of	 capacities	may	be	 intact	 in	 these	patients.	But	 the	
capacity	for	relationship	also	requires	the	ability	to	communicate	if	only	in	the	most	




feasible	 for	 these	 patients	 to	 sustain	 relationships	 with	 others	 via	 fMRI.	 I	 shall	
return	below	to	the	issue	of	what	it	would	mean	if	that	were	to	change—if	it	were	to	
become	possible	to	sustain	relationships	with	such	patients	via	technology.	But	for		




we	 can	 conclude	 that	 one	 of	 two	 things	 is	 true	 of	 their	 current	 state.	 On	 the	 one	
hand,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 the	 mental	 life	 these	 patients	 experience	 is	 so	 broken,	
fragmented,	and	confused	that	they	may	lack	the	capacity	to	focus	on,	or	care	about,	
much	at	all.	If	that	is	the	case,	my	view	suggests	that	currently	they	are	not	deriving	
any	 benefit	 from	 life.	 If	 that	 is	 their	 permanent	 lot,	 then	 they	 never	 will	 derive	
benefit.	If	that	is	the	case,	continued	life	is	neither	in	their	interest	nor	against	it.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 also	possible	 that	 such	 patients	may	 be	more	 intact	mentally	
than	 even	 the	 results	 so	 far	 have	 suggested.	 But	 even	 if	 that	 is	 the	 case,	 they	 are	
extremely	isolated.	In	this	case	too,	because	they	cannot	interact	with	their	world	or	
sustain	even	the	simplest	relationships	with	others,	it	is	also	likely	that	they	do	not	
benefit	 from	 life.	 But	 here,	 unlike	 the	 case	 of	 impaired	newborns—we	 should	not	
conclude	that	continued	life	is	neutral—neither	good	nor	bad.	For	if	in	this	case	the	









sometimes	thought	 to	cast	doubt	on	this	do	not	really	do	so.	First,	 it	 is	sometimes	
said	that	ordinary	people	vastly	underestimate	the	quality	of	 life	of	 those	who	are	
severely	 disabled,	 and	 that	 to	 the	 surprise	 of	 those	who	 are	 ‘normal,’	many	 such	
individuals	wish	to	remain	alive.25	That	such	mistakes	are	easy	and	frequent,	I	fully	
grant.	Indeed,	I	usually	find	myself	on	the	side	of	those	who	argue	for	a	more	fine-
grained	 appreciation	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 those	 who	 are	 disabled,	 and	 I	 favor	
maintaining	the	life	of	most	disabled	people,	even	many	of	those	who	are	severely	
cognitively	disabled.26	However,	most	disabilities,	even	extreme	ones,	do	not	 leave	
individuals	so	 isolated.	Communication	of	 some	sort	 is	 typically	possible	and	such	
individuals	can	thus	derive	benefit	from	the	love	and	care	of	others.		
	 Second,	 it	 is	 sometimes	 pointed	 out	 that	 even	 patients	 with	 Locked-In	
Syndrome	(LIS),	a	neurological	disorder	in	which	a	patient	is	fully	conscious	despite	






















Surely,	 this	 suggests	 that	 we	 should	 not	 be	 too	 quick	 to	 judge	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
minimally	conscious.	However,	as	I	see	it,	this	claim	underscores	just	how	poor	we	
really	are	at	seeing	the	differences	and	similarities	that	matter	from	the	standpoint	
of	quality	of	 life.	From	our	point	of	view,	 it	may	make	sense	 to	compare	a	patient	
with	Locked-In	Syndrome	to	a	patient	who	is	minimally	conscious,	because	both	are	
completely	 bed-bound,	 completely	 dependent	 on	 high-level	 care,	 and	 because	 in	
both	cases	it	is	hard	for	us	to	know	what	is	going	on	‘inside.’	But	there	is	a	difference	
here	 that	makes	all	 the	difference.	Most	 individuals	with	Locked-In	Syndrome	are	
able	 to	 communicate,	 even	 if	 communication	 is	 laborious	 and	 burdensome.28	





	 To	 summarize,	 if	 we	 focus	 simply	 on	 what	 we	 know	 about	 the	 current	

























for	 whom	 the	 diagnosis	 is	 permanent	 (they	 are	 permanently	 vegetative	 or	
permanently	 in	a	minimally	conscious	state	as	currently	defined),	 there	remains	a	
question	 about	 whether	 relationships	 might	 one	 day	 be	 established	 with	 such	




are	 squeezing	 your	 right-hand	 into	 a	 fist	 and	 then	 relaxing	 it…)”	 and	 not	 for	
communication	 purposes.	 But	 perhaps	 it	 will	 eventually	 provide	 a	 way	 to	
communicate.	Because	EEG	is	so	much	less	expensive,	it	is	at	least	more	feasible	to	
think	that	this	method	might	become	widespread.	If	that	came	about,	then	I	would,	
other	 things	being	equal,	 favor	seeing	whether	 it	 is	possible	 to	sustain	meaningful	





















life	 without	 relationships	 is	 not	 worth	 living,	 we	 must	 not	 assume	 that	 once	
relationships	are	possible,	continued	life	is	a	pure	benefit.		
	 Second,	 and	 perhaps	 even	 more	 importantly,	 I	 am	 concerned	 about	 the	
conclusions	some	people	may	draw	about	best	interests,	given	that	right	now	such	
communication	 is	 not	 possible	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 PVS	 and	 PMCS	 patients.	 I	 am	
worried	that	 loved	ones	or	courts	may,	with	the	best	of	 intentions,	seek	to	sustain	
the	 lives	 of	 such	 patients	 indefinitely	 in	 the	 hope	 of	 one	 day	 being	 able	 to	 re-















concluded	 (in	 light	 of	 the	 recent	 research	 findings)	 that	 things	 are	 looking	 up	 for	
PVS	 and	 MCS	 patients.	 But	 really,	 the	 picture	 has	 simply	 become	 much	 more	




assume)	 or	 they	 are	 capable	 of	 being	 benefited	 or	 harmed,	 and	 may	 actually	 be	
suffering	quite	a	bit.	While	I	won’t	deny	there	are	cases	where	it	may	make	sense	to	
try	 to	 establish	 some	 sort	 of	 connection	 with	 patients	 via	 technology,	 we	 should	
proceed	 very	 cautiously	 and	hesitate	 to	 do	 anything	 that	might	 prolong	 suffering.	
We	should	always	keep	in	mind	that	despite	our	epistemic	limitations,	we	know	that	
currently	 things	 are	 either	 neutral	 for	 them	 or	 bad.	 So,	 the	 default	 assumption—








she	 is	 getting	 anything	 positive	 out	 of	 her	 life.	 I	 assume	 that	 a	 life	 of	 extended	
suffering	is	not	worth	living,	and	that	when	the	answer	to	the	first	question	is	a	clear	
yes,	 we	 ought	 to	 allow	 the	 incompetent	 patient	 to	 die.	 Moreover,	 I	 think	 it	 is	
important	to	remember	that	suffering	can	be	present	even	when	pain	is	not	(though	
we	 shouldn’t	 forget	 about	 pain).	 Emotional	 suffering	 can	 do	 just	 as	 much	 to	
undermine	 the	value	of	 life	as	 suffering	caused	by	physical	pain.	Unfortunately,	 in	
the	cases	that	interest	us	here,	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	know	whether	the	patients	
suffer.		
	 I	 have	 also	 argued	 that	 we	 should	 ask	 whether	 a	 person	 is	 deriving	 any	
benefit	 from	 her	 life.	 If	 she	 is,	 this	 must	 be	 considered	 and	 weighed	 against	 any	
burdens.	There	will	be	a	category	of	patients	for	whom	it	is	true	that	life	is	neither	
beneficial	 nor	 harmful.	 This	 is	 true	 of	 patients	 who	 have	 permanently	 lost	 all	
consciousness,	though	as	the	recent	research	reveals,	with	certain	classes	of	patients	





of	 caring	about	anything	or	of	 forming	and	maintaining	even	 the	simplest	 sorts	of	
relationships.			
	 Finally,	I	have	argued	that	in	the	case	of	PVS	and	PMCS	patients,	we	may	be	
able	to	get	around	some	of	 the	difficulties	 that	arise	 from	the	 fact	 that	we	have	so	
little	knowledge	of	what	goes	on	inside.	For	even	though	it	is	not	clear	what	precise	




about,	 their	 life	 is	 a	 life	 of	 suffering.	 They	 may	 have	 the	 internal	 capacities	 for	
forming	and	maintaining	relationships,	but	they	have	no	way	to	operationalize	these	
capacities.	 In	 that	 case,	 life	 becomes	 a	 burden.	 Thus,	 if	 we	 limit	 ourselves	 to	
reflection	 on	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 such	 patients,	 best	 interests	 point	 towards	
allowing	them	to	die.	Death	is	either	neutral	or	a	blessing.		
	 This	conclusion	must	be	qualified,	of	course,	since	it	is	based	on	claims	about	
the	 importance	of	 relationships	and	since	 it	 is	at	 least	possible	 that	 some	of	 these	
patients	may	at	some	point	in	the	future	be	able	to	maintain	relationships.	However,	
we	 must	 be	 extremely	 cautious	 here.	 Many	 issues	 unrelated	 to	 my	 topic	 of	 best	






as	 it	 becomes	 possible	 to	 try	 communicating	 with	 them.	 Not	 all	 suffering	 can	 be	
compensated	by	future	gains,	and	we	must	take	seriously	their	current	situation.		
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